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SYMPOSIUM

REFLECTIONS ON THE SENATE INVESTIGATION OF ARMY
SURVEILLANCE
LAWRENCE M.

BASKIRt

[S. 2318]'s indiscriminate lumping together of all kinds of
innocent information or literature within the prohibited ambit
of "maintaining and recording" information on beliefs, ass6ciations or political activities is a serious flaw and itself a
possible infringement upon [the military's] first amendment
rights.'
INTRODUCTION

In public hearings on April 9 and 10, 1974, the Constitutional
Rights Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee addressed
once again, after an interlude of three years, the problem of military
surveillance of domestic political activities of American citizens.' Despite
general expectations, the 1974 hearifigs were not planned as yet another
expos6 of the military spying scandal. They were, instead, a sober and
fairly technical examination of the merits of a bill' proposed by Senator
Ervin. The bill's purpose is to amend existing prohibitions on military
involvement in civilian political affairs by creating a criminal prohibition against the collection of information on political activities of
American civilians not affiliated with the military. 4
The story of this controversy has been told in numerous press and
magazine articles and legislative reports, and will be the subject of at
least two extensive books;' the legal aspects have been explored by a
t Chief Counsel and Staff Director, Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Senate
Committee on the Judiciary.
1. Testimony of David 0. Cooke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration); Hearings on S. 2318 Before the Subcomn. on Constitutional Rights of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,93d Cong., 2d Sess. 103, 107 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
1974 Hearings].
2. r974 Hearings.
3. S. 2318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
4. A bill to enforce the first amendment and fourth amendment to the Constitution, and the constitutional right of privacy by prohibiting any civil or military officer of the U.S. or the militia of any State from using the Armed Forces
of the United States or the militia of any State to exercise surveillance of civilians or to execute the civil laws, and for other purposes.
x974 Hearings at 8.
5. For a sample of contemporaneous news and other reports see Hearings on Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights, Before the Subconzm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [here-
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number of commentators.' The purpose of this article is to describe how
the Constitutional Rights Subcommittee conducted its investigation, what
role litigation played in the inquiry, and what the ultimate legislative
response is likely to be. The investigation deserves to be examined for
the insights it gives into the operation of the investigative role of Congress and for the knowledge it may give us of how the military establishment and, by extension, the entire executive branch, responds to legislative oversight. For those readers of law reviews who are accustomed
to evaluating a legal issue from within the four walls of briefs and reported opinions, this discourse may also shed light on the role constitutional litigation plays in political controversies over public policy.
THE EARLY STAGE OF THE INVESTIGATION
To an American public not yet accustomed to the Watergate
climate, and unaware of the military's long history of such activity,
the publication of an article in January 1970, exposing a broad program
of Army political surveillance within the United States,' came as a
great shock. The article, written by former Captain Christopher Pyle,
until recently an instructor at the Army Intelligence School, disclosed
that the Army for some years had systematically collected reports on
political events throughout the country and that these reports were
computerized at Army Intelligence Headquarters at Fort Holabird,
Maryland.' Pyle's revelations were based in large part on a few conversations he had had with members of Army intelligence and a brief
tour of the Holabird facility. The immediate result of his article was
a series of public denials by senior Army officials, along with a rash
of letters of inquiry from Senators and Congressmen. Among those
writing inquiries was Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Chairman of the Constitutional Rights Subcommittee.'
inafter cited as 1971 Hearings]. Both Christopher Pyle and Lt Col. William Mann, Jr.,
former Chief, Civil Disturbance Branch, OACSI, Department of Army, are presently
preparing manuscripts for publication.
6. See, e.g., Christie, Government Surveillance and Individual Freedom: A Proposed Statutory Response to Laird v. Tatum and the Broader Problem of Go'vernment
Surveillance of the Individual, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 871 (1972) ; Comment, Laird v. Tatum:
The Supreme Court and a First Amendment Challenge to Military Surveillance of Lawful Civilian PoliticalActivity, 1 HOFSTRA L. REv. 244 (1973) ; 11 DUQuESNE L. REv. 419
(1973); 41 Gzo. WASrr. L. REv. 385 (1972) ; 21 Am. U.L. REv. 262 (1971).
7. Pyle, CONUS Intelligence: The Army Watches Civilian Politics, WASHINGTON
MoNTHLY,

Jan. 1970, at 4-16, in 1971 Hearings, supra note 5, at 1683-99.

8. Id. at 4, 1971 Hearings.

9. Great things often have curious beginnings; in this case the beginnings were
curious indeed. One of the subcommittee staff members had his attention called to the
article by an English neighbor then taking citizenship classes. Challenged to reconcile
the precepts the Government was teaching prospective citizens with the implications of
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The reply that Ervin received was the same as that received by the
other legislators who had written." In it, Army General Counsel Jordan
described at great length the various plrograms and file systems maintained by the Army. His reply also described the civil disturbance responsibilities of the Army and its need for information. The letter was
long, reassuring, and entirely plausible. Its purpose was to be responsive
to the legislative complaints, but more important, to be disarming.
In this respect, it was almost entirely successful. Most of the legislators
who had written were mollified and soon retired from the controversy.
Ervin, however, did not, for two reasons. First, he was seeking
precise facts for his general survey. Jordan's letter provided no details
for any of the sixteen explicit questions raised in the January letter.
The second reason was also crucial. Unlike most public muckrackers,
Pyle was not satisfied with a single dramatic expos& As a graduate
of law school, a Ph. D. candidate in political science, and as an aspiring
professor of American government, he wanted a full exploration of
the program and some concrete legislative response. Further, he was
almost as strong an admirer of the Army as he was of the Constitution.
Army surveillance, he felt, was not only improper from a constitutional
perspective, but was wrong and unnecessary, and dangerous for the
Army. He took his article with him to Washington seeking a Congressman or Senator who would help him achieve his goals.
By the time Jordan's letter arrived, Pyle had discussed the issue
with the subcommittee staff several times, had persuaded staff members
of his bona fides, and had offered his expert knowledge. When Jordan's
letter came, the staff was in an unusually good position to analyze it.
As a consequence, Ervin was not persuaded by the reassuring words
from the Army. His reply, dated only two days after Jordan's letter
was received, beginning with the words, "Thank you for your interim
the Pyle article, the staffer took the problem to Ervin. Ervin's first letter was couched
in terms of a formal inquiry into Army practices and regulations regarding data banks
and computers. Letter from Sam Ervin to Stanley R. Resor, Jan. 22, 1970, in 1971 Hearings, supra note 5, at 1047.
The subcommittee had for a number of years been exploring this question'with a
variety of government departments. It had just previously been engaged in an extended
inquiry with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare about its program of
political clearance for scientific and honorific advisory appointments and with the Secret
Service over its program of collecting the names of "gate crashers" and expounders of
"suspect" remarks for its own computer. Ervin had previously addressed this subject in
a Senate speech. See 115 CONG. REc. 39114 (1969). Because of this background, Ervin's
letter was grounded in a more substantial legislative interest than the majority of the
other inquiries. See Pyle, CONUS Revisited: The Army Covers Up, WASHINGTON
MONTHLY, July 1970, at 50, in 1971 Hearings at 1693-94 [hereinafter cited as CONUS
Revisited].
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reply to the Subcommittee's inquiry,"" signaled as much to the services.
While the other legislators used the Army response as public evidence
that the Army had remedied the problem, Ervin perservered. 2
The course of the investigation over the succeeding months can
best be understood by a reading of the hearing materials and reports
the subcommittee eventually published." There were, however, a few
high points between this date and the hearings of February and March,
1971, which deserve elaboration. One of the more important developments was the fact that a few newspapers were prepared to assign
investigative reporters to cover the story and to support their reporters
during long fallow periods when nothing newsworthy seemed, to be
happening. 4 These reporters were in a position to complement the subcommittee's inquiries with interviews of former agents and government officials, and with tracking down loose ends. They provided
essential legwork without which the investigation could not have proceeded. They also gave public exposure to the additional evidence that
Pyle was collecting through his contacts with former intelligence students.
The first watershed was reached in July 1970, when Pyle published
a second article.' 5 In it he accused the Army of making essentially
cosmetic reforms, while still continuing most of its surveillace.' Pyle
was especially devastating in his analysis of what he called "plausible
denials"-apparently candid rebuttals which avoided direct responses
and which were meant to mislead.'" Pyle listed many activities by the
Army that were in direct contradiction to official statements. Perhaps
most damaging of all, he made it clear that the civilian officials in the
10. The letter from Robert E. Jordan III to Sam Ervin, Feb. 25, 1970, is reprinted
in 1971 Hearings,supra note 5, at 1048.
11. Letter from Sam Ervin to Stanley R. Resor, Feb. 27, 1970, in 197i Hearings at
1050 (emphasis added).
12. CONUS Revisited, sitpra note 9, at 52, 1971 Hearings at 1695.
13. In addition to the 197t Hearings, two reports were eventually published by the
subcommittee: STAFF OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS SUBCOMM., SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY,

ANALYSIS

92D CONG., 2D SEss., ARMY SURVEILLANCE OF CIVILIANS: A
(Comm. Print 1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 REPORT], and

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, SENATE COIMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,

TARY SURVEILLANCE OF

1973

CIVILIAN

POLITICS (Comm. Print

93D

DOCUMENTARY

SUBCOmm. ON

CONG., IST SESS.,

1973)

MILI-

[hereinafter cited as

REPORT].

14. These reporters included Jared Stout, Newhouse News Service; Morton Kondracke, Chicago Sun-Times; and Richard Halloran, New York Times.
15. CONUS Revisited, supra note 9, at 49.
16.

Id., 1971 Hearingsat 1693.

17. Id. at 50, 1971 Hearings at 1693. For example, the Army confirmed the existence of its nationwide intelligence apparatus, but said it collected information only in
relation to Army civil disturbance responsibilities. Also, the Army acknowledged that
it did publish an identification list of persons active in past civil disturbances, but failed
to mention that the list also contained descriptions of persons never involved in civil
disturbances.
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Department were probably unaware of what their military subordinates
were really doing."
Ervin's inquiries began to bear fruit in the receipt of the legal and
administrative paper that formed the foundation (or lack of foundation)
for the surveillance program. 9 The continuing public pressure, together
with the unseen efforts of the Army's civilian leadership, finally resulted
in the so-called Lynch directive of June 9 outlining new and more stringent limitations on Army surveillance.2" While the new directive was
a decided improvement over earlier efforts to reassure the public, by
this time Ervin and the subcommittee staff were not easily reassured.
Ervin's response to the directive informed the Army of a planned set of
hearings in the fall on the entire subject.2 It included ten additional,
specific inquiries seeking the Army's interpretation of the new directive.
It also contained Ervin's summary rejection of the Army's claim that
the directiVe was an adequate solution to the disclosures of the past six
months:
I confess that the exceptions, qualifications, and lack of
criteria in your policy letter could lead the average citizenwhich I consider myself-to wonder just how much of a
change it represents in government policy.22
By the time fall arrived, Ervin had scheduled three days of hearings to explore Army surveillance and other computer issues involving
privacy." While the staff lobbied hard for such hearings, there was a
definite feeling that the Army surveillance issue had faded and that the
hearings would not attract much public attention or develop a great deal
of new information.
18.

By illustration, he described Jordan's surprising, discovery during a field in-

spection of computers that he had been told, and had so told the Congress, did not exist.
Id. at 50-51, 1971 Hearingsat 1694.
19. The various regulations and other materials pertaining to the authority for the
programs are reprinted in 197i Hearings, pt. 2.
20. Adjutant General's letter directive of June 9, 1970, Dep't of the Army, Collection, Reporting, Processing, and Storage of Civil Disturbance Information, in 1971 Hearings at 1099. Two subsequent Adjutant General directives were issued later that year:
Adjutant General's letter directive of July 31, 1970, Dep't of the Army, Policy Limitations on Counterintelligence Coverage of Racial Matters, in 197i Hearings at 1117; and
Adjutant General's letter directive of December 15, 1970, Dep't of the Army [Wickham
Directive], Counterintelligence Activities Concerning Civilians Not Affiliated with the
Department of Defense, in 197i Hearings at 1142. The Wickham Directive was altered
in important respects by a classified modification issued at the same time.
21. Letter from Sam Ervin to Stanley R. Resor, July 27, 1970, in 1971 Hearings at
1102.

22. Id.
23. 1975 Hearings at 1661.
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There was, nonetheless, a considerable let-down when Ervin informed the staff several days before the hearings were scheduled to open
that his schedule on the Senate floor was too full to permit hearings. The
cancellation, while a severe disappointment to the staff at the time,
later praved a blessing. Despite nine months of hard work, the staff
had in fact only scratched the surface. All throughout this period of the
investigation the staff investigators had no real idea of the scope or
dimensions of the program they were examining.
APPROACHING PUBLIC HEARINGS

Following the cancellation, events moved out of the control of both
the subcommittee staff and the military. All during the prior period, the
subcommittee had been in the position of guiding press investigations,
giving out information, receiving leads and facts from former agents,
formulating inquiries, and evaluating Army responses. During the fall,
however, a number of television documentaries were in progress, and
the investigations conducted in the course of preparing for them were
kept secret by the networks. The most dramatic of these was an NBC
documentary produced by Tom Pettit and aired December 1, 1970.4
More than newspaper stories, Senate speeches, and magazine articles,
this documentary had a widespread and dramatic impact. It conveyed
to the public the story on Army surveillance in a way that made it
immediate and hard-hitting.
The immediate result was a resurgence in public and press interest
in the subcommittee's work-a needed tonic to a discouraged and played
out investigation. More important, it persuaded a former Army intelligence sergeant named John O'Brien that there were important people
in Washington who might listen to what he said. Having seen the
program, O'Brien wrote a letter to NBC and to each of the Senators,
Congressmen and other figures featured in the program." In it, O'Brien
described a far broader scope of Army surveillance than the subcommittee had previously known about. He said that it covered all civilian
groups opposing the war in Vietnam or the Nixon administration's
domestic policies. O'Brien also said the surveillance was directed at
public figures, including elected officials at the state and federal level."
O'Brien's letter was written December 7, 1970. Senator Ervin
released that letter on December 16. The intervening week was a busy
period for the subcommittee staff. O'Brien's charges clearly opened up
24. First Tuesday, "The Man From Uncle (Sam)," NBC Television Network.
25.

z97x Hearings at 1679.

26. Id.
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new and potentially unlimited implications for the program. Up to
that time, it had appeared that the surveillance was largely directed at
public trouble-makers-those individuals and groups actively involved in
violent civil disturbances. The letter suggested that the program covered
the entire range of disagreement with administration policy. O'Brien said
the surveillance was not aimed at "radicals" or "activists" but at established political figures and institutions, as well.
O'Brien's letter was potentially damaging but could not be ignored.
The problem of how to deal with it was finally resolved by requesting
Pyle and an investigative reporter who had also received a copy of the
letter to go to Chicago and evaluate O'Brien's story. This they did in a
manner which divorced the subcommittee from any direct involvement,
yet which still persuaded O'Brien that his charges were being weighed by
a Senate committee. When the two unofficial subcommittee investigators
returned, they were convinced that O'Brien was a sound, reasonable, and
truthful witness, and that he was familiar with his intelligence unit's
operations. During the course of their 36-hour interview they got specific
information on some of the targets of the program, including the names
of Illinois local, state and federal officials who had been subject to the
unit's surveillance. Based on this evaluation of O'Brien's credibility,
Ervin agreed to disclose this information in a Senate speech.27
Ervin's speech, while carefully phrased to protect him as much as
possible from the possibility that O'Brien's charges would collapse, still
placed him squarely in a new and vulnerable position. After describing
the background of the inquiry and the fairly narrow scope of the Army
program as then known, Ervin related in summary what O'Brien had
said:
It appears that Army intelligence, at least since 1968, but
probably earlier as well, and up to June of this year at least,
was actively covering the activities of individuals and groups
against whom no charge .of political- extremism can possibly be
made.
The individuals who were "targeted" for surveillancespying, in common parlance-include a Member of this body,
27.

Ervin's statement to the Senate was delivered late in the day December 16, 1970.

116 CONG. REc. 41750 (1970).

Before giving the speech, Senator Ervin had the subcommittee check with each of
the figures for permission to name them as subjects of the Army spying. Each of them
was outraged, and only one had objections to a public identification, believing that identification as a subject of surveillance might engender in the public a belief that the attention was deserved. In the end, the official allowed his name to be used, and suffered no
adverse political effects.
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the junior Senator from Illinois, Mr. Stevenson; the former
Governor of Illinois, now Judge Otto Kerner, a Member of the
other body, Congressman Abner Mikva; State and local
officials; plus well-known political contributors of both parties,
newspaper reporters, religious figures, lawyers and local and
national political figures. These are only a few of the reportedly
800 individuals who were targets of the military intelligence
system in only one State, Illinois. 8
The result of the speech and the accompanying press account was
electric. President Nixon, through his press secretary, said he was
•"totally, completely, and unequivocally" opposed to such spying and
that it "absolutely was not going on in dny way at this time."" The story
was carried nationally and displayed prominently on TV. Other agents
came forward to give more examples, and Congress responded with a
chorus of demands for investigators and answers.
The Army's denial, issued shortly thereafter by the Secretary of the
Army, read in pertinent part as follows:
A preliminary check has been completed. On the basis of
information I have received, I can state that neither Senator
Stevenson, Representative Mikva nor former Governor Kerner
are or ever have been the subject of military intelligence activities or investigations related to political activities. Allegations to the contrary are without foundation in fact."°
On the face of it, Secretary Resor's denial was straightforward,
unequivocal, and complete. It was a direct contradiction of O'Brien's
charges about Senator Stevenson, Congressman Mikva, and Governor
Kerner. Strictly speaking, a successful repudiation of these points
should not have detracted from the major substantive charge concerning
28. Id. at 41751, 1971 Hearings,spra note 5, at 1678.
He also challenged the asserted basis for the surveillance as he had consistently
heard it from the Army:
As reported to me, the reason for this surveillance was that the Army could
determine the political proclivities of the individuals involved, and forecast their
reactions to certain situations. The information was used to predict political
behavior, voting patterns, political alliances, and political activities of men who
are part of the normal, regular, constitutional, "established" political system of
our country.

Id.

29. The President's remarks appear in 1971 Hearings at 1719. The 1970 Huston
Plan on domestic surveillance was prepared with the reluctant cooperation of Army
officers, but as approved by the President, it assigned the military no active role. Testimony of Col. John Downie, U.S. Army (ret.), 1974 Hearings, supra note 1, at 38, 71.
30. z97s Hearings at 1299 (emphasis added).
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the more extensive scope of the surveillance. Nor should it have affected
the disclosures of the previous twelve months. But practically, it was
very clear that O'Brien's statement about Stevenson and the other
officials had become the precarious foundation upon which the subcommittee's entire work now rested.
Resor's statements in other respects were not so much denials as a
"confession and avoidance." Naturally enough, the Army's reply was
aimed at the most vulnerable and most dramatic, if not the most important, aspects of O'Brien's allegations. It was the word of the Secretary of
the Army against that of a former sergeant. The best the subcommittee could do was to point out that the Army's unequivocal denial
was based on a preliminary check and on the basis of information which
the Secretary had received. The staff argued that the Army was only
making good use of the old device of the carefully hedged, "unequivocal"
denial.
The Army did not mention that its investigation was only three
days long, nor did it mention whom it had questioned, or what it had
learned. As it turned out, the Army had called in the commanding
officer and the senior civilian from O'Brien's unit. They had flown in
from Chicago and denied O'Brien's story. The Army had made no other
independent inquiry at this time.
The other important consequence of the O'Brien disclosure was
that, after leaving the Army with the controversy for an entire year,
the Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, now decided it was a problem
which required his personal attention. Suddenly, the subcommittee was
no longer dealing with the Army General Counsel, Robert Jordan, or the
Secretary, Stanley Resor. Now the man in charge was J. Fred Buzhardt, Department of Defense General Counsel and Laird's senior trouble
shooter. One of the first signs of Secretary Laird's new role was the
issuance of a directive to all DOD agencies and departments setting
forth the Secretary's policy on surveillance."l The first paragraph
expressed his concern that individual and constitutional rights be carefully observed in all intelligence activities of the Department.
The balance of the order made clear that the Secretary had more on
his mind than the Ervin investigation. He proposed a reorganization and
centralization of all intelligence and investigative efforts within the Secretary's office. Among unfinished business of the DOD reorganization of
1947 was the question of intelligence. It had been a sore spot of contention among the various services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and succeed31. Id. at 1299-1300.
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ing Secretaries of Defense. Access to and control of military intelligence
play a key role in policy disputes within the Defense Department between
civilian and military leaders. These factors can be critical to the influence
each of the parties has within the National Security Council and with
the President and Congress. What Laird had done was to use the
opportunity of this embarrassing but limited dispute over one facet of
military intelligence to provide the Secretary with the opportunity to
seek full administrative control over all military intelligence from the
services."
Following the O'Brien disclosures and the rapid sequence of events
that they produced, the subcommittee began to prepare for hearings in
early spring. One important aspect of these hearings was that the chairman did not want them to be exclusively concerned with the Army
problem. Also of importance was the far less dramatic, but much more
intractable, problem of focusing attention on the rapid proliferation of
federal data banks and computers and on individual privacy in areas
which did not involve politically sensitive activities. While the importance of the controversy over the Army's intelligence gathering is not to
be underrated, it was a program that most people would consider to be
clearly outside the legitimate governmental domain. As such, it could
be cleared up, without undue difficulty. By contrast, the other kinds of
government data collection had a much firmer justification in law and
policy. The problem here was to persuade the public and the government
to place restrictions and controls on otherwise legitimate programs in
order to minimize invasions of personal privacy. While by 1974 this
issue has received much public attention, in early 1971 the subcommittee
was faced with introducing the problem largely for the first time.
THE

ARMY SURVEILLANCE HEARINGS

The preparation for the hearings essentially took two parts. One
staff member arranged for the non-Army portion, while most of the
staff resources were devoted to the surveillance question. Despite the
temptations and the pressure of the press, the first day of hearings did not
focus on Army surveillance at all. The subcommittee instead invited a
number of lawyers and professors to speak about the right to privacy in
general, and the importance of the issue for individual rights. Despite
the low-key start, the press and TV coverage was extensive. The hearings
32. The final result was less than Laird had sought. While personal background
investigations were centralized in the Defense Investigative Service, intelligence on "potentially hostile nations" remained the prerogative of the individual services. See x97r

Hearingsat 1300.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
were held in the klieg lights and awesome grandeur of the Senate Caucus
Room, a hearing site that is almost a precondition for making history.
Despite the slow start, the opening day made headlines in the New
York Times."
The second day led off with John O'Brien, 4 who had obviously
become the star witness. Fortunately, he had been persuaded not to
respond to the importunings of the press in the two months that followed
his disclosures and so had not been tempted to embellish his story beyond
supportable limits. O'Brien was not coached by the staff, who indeed
did not meet him until shortly before the hearing day. As in a trial, a
garrulous witness in an investigative hearing can be trouble, but O'Brien
did well. Despite close questioning by Senator Hruska (R-Neb.) and
Senator Thurmond (R-S.C.), the latter a member of the Armed Services Committee and a Reserve Air Force General, and both formidable
interrogators, O'Brien managed to avoid any inroads into his story.
The impression he made was very favorable. 5
Once past O'Brien, the subcommittee's principal case went smoothly.
It consisted largely of a number of former intelligence agents who gave
various examples of the surveillance they had conducted or of which
they were aware. This was supplemented by testimony of a few subjects of the surveillance."6 The individual experiences were put into
context by an extended analysis and description of the results of the
subcommittee's inquiries by Christopher Pyle." Finally, a noted professor of military science gave his views on the dangers to society and
to the military of this activity."
The military witnesses were scheduled to appear on the second
Tuesday of the hearings. Pursuant to the subcommittee's request, a
draft statement was delivered to the staff the Friday before. Among
the more significant aspects of the testimony was the admission that,
33. The headline read: Senators Hear Threat of a "Dossier Dictatorship," N.Y.
Times, Feb. 24, 1971, at 1, col. 5.
34. r97i Hearings at 91, 100.
35. Id. at 106-10, 118-25.
36. Such targets included Curtis Graves, Texas State Representative, see id. at 336;
Abner Mikva, then U.S. Congressman from Illinois, see id. at 130; John A. Sullivan and
Stewart Meachem, American Friends Service Committee, and Pete Parra, college student, see id. at 351.
37. Id. at 147 (statement of Christopher H. Pyle).
Particularly telling was the testimony of one former serviceman who had been a
clerk-typist with the military task force set up to investigate the charges first outlined
by Pyle a year earlier. He testified to the efforts of the task force to conceal or mis-

lead the civilian authorities within the Department of the Army who were themslves trying to find out what had happened. Id. at 277 (statement of Edward Sohier).

38. Id. at 344 (statement of Morris Janowitz, Professor of Sociology, University
of Chicago).
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after two months of denials, the Army had indeed finally discovered a
file on Senator Stevenson. " With this concession, the political and
psychological initiative shifted permanently to the subcommittee.
Appearing as chief witness for the Department was Assistant
Secretary of Defense Froehlke, accompanied by DOD General Counsel
Buzhardt and Army General Counsel Jordan. The military, chiefly by
Buzhardt, had prepared a 50-page statement, plus an extensive appendix.
Despite the staff's desire to have it summarized, and Froehlke's obvious
hope that the chairman would so direct, it was apparent that Buzhardt intended to have the statement read in full. In a strained and not at all
riveting style, the Assistant Secretary of Defense proceeded to use up
the entire morning session. The tactic was not without purpose. Not
only did it serve to occupy time otherwise useful for questions, but it
served to deaden just about everyone at the hearings. By the time the
afternoon session began, most of the press had left to file stories based
on the Department's testimony; the cameras had shut down; the Senators
were exhausted; and any important revelations that the interrogation
might produce would largely escape public attention. One wonders
whether more might have been produced if the filibuster had not been
so effective.
DIFFICULTIES WITH THE

DOD

With the testimony of the Department, the hearings passed to the
more general subject of computers and privacy, and little of direct
relevance to Army surveillance was developed, with one exception.
When William Rehnquist, then Assistant Attorney General for the
Office of Legal Counsel, testified, he disclosed that a number of documents prepared by the Army in the course of its surveillance program
were now under his personal control for the purposes of litigation
then being conducted. Senator Ervin asked for copies and Rehnquist
readily agreed.4" Surprisingly, they were delivered to the subcommittee
41
with a total absence of difficulty or hindrance.
In this case the materials were extremely extensive, consisting of
computer printouts and other documents totaling hundreds of pages and
39. Id. at 375, 389 (statement of Robert F. Froehlke, Assistant Secretary of Defense).
40. Id. at 597, 622 (statement of William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General).
41. This was a highly unusual occurrence, and undoubtedly was due to Rehnqtuist's
personal efforts to aid the committee. It was in sharp contrast to the difficulties the subcommittee later had in getting other information directly from the Defense Department.
Rarely, if ever before, had raw political intelligence files of the government been given
to a critical congressional committee.
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standing over four feet high. The materials were analyzed by the staff
and described at length in a 97-page staff report.'
They proved invaluable in giving the subcommittee a first-hand knowledge of how the
Army and, by extension, other federal agencies collect political intelligence on Americans.
While relations between the Army and the subcommittee were never
particularly warm nor overly cooperative during the first twelve months
of the subcommittee's investigation, they were always proper and formal.
The subcommittee was not confronted with any unusual obstruction
beyond what all executive departments display when dealing with what
they consider to be overly curious legislative committees. This relationship deteriorated noticeably after December 16 when responsibility
shifted from Jordan to Buzhardt. Thereafter, the subcommittee was
subjected to extensive delays, evasions and obstacles in its quest for
information.
The problem became evident very quickly when Senator Ervin requested the attendance of certain officials at the hearings. In particular,
he sought the testimony of a number of uniformed intelligence officers
who could give first-hand information on the origins, purposes, and military value of the intelligence program. Informal requests that the generals
be made available proved fruitless, and so the chairman then made a
formal request." Buzhardt's reply was polite, but negative. He suggested that the generals might be material witnesses in possible future
administrative or criminal proceedings, and that their appearance might
affect the due process rights of persons involved in these proceedings.
Furthermore, he said that two of the generals were then overseas.
Ervin then wrote directly to Secretary Laird, by-passing Buzhardt. 4 4 In the letter Ervin asked for the particulars on the legal action
to which Buzhardt had referred. He also pointed out the critical gaps
that remained in the record. Those were, first, the absence of any
underlying documents and evidence to support and elucidate the vague
and conclusory statements which formed most of Secretary Froehlke's
testimony, and second, the failure to provide professional military assessments of the surveillance program.
As the record then stood, there was no way the subcommittee or
the public could assess for itself the picture put forth by the Department.
42. 1972 REPORT, supra note 13.
43. Letter from Sam Ervin to Robert F. Froehlke, Feb. 18, 1971, in

1971

Hearings,

supra note 5, at 1216.
44. Letters from Sam Ervin to Melvin Laird, Mar. 4, 1971, and Mar. 12, 1971, in
1971 Hearings at 1217, 1218.
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It was critical to have a professional evaluation of the surveillance program to substantiate the subcommittee's belief that it had no value from
an intelligence or military perspective. Absent that support, there was the
danger that the intelligence arm would not be reconciled to the program's
cessation. If the feeling developed that the program was halted solely
for political reasons, there would be no assurance that it would not be
resumed in some future crisis." Buzhardt responded to Ervin's letter
with a discourse on the information already provided and its sufficiency
for the subcommittee's investigation. In his view, there was no need
for any more information, nor, of course, for the generals.4 6
The pattern of the next year was set by this post-hearing exchange.
The subcommittee continued to seek more and more detail. It was met
with answers which provided as little as possible, while asserting that
the subcommittee had all it needed. Ervin's letters got stronger and more
insistent as time went on. The Defense responses became more impatient.
A high point--or low point-came when Laird himself responded on
April 19 with a long review of the cooperation the Department had
given. In the course of the letter he pointedly said that, as for the
generals, "I do not believe it appropriate" for them to appear. The
desired testimony should be (and, of course, had been) furnished by
"my designated representative, Mr. Robert Froehlke."4 7
This offended Ervin to an exceptional degree. It was quite normal
for the Department to want to end an embarrassing inquiry as quickly
as possible and to take the position that the hearings were the conclusion, not the middle, of the investigation. Executive agencies take this
position as a matter of course, and they use every argument they can
think of ta blunt or wear down a congressional investigation. Usually
this is successful. Because of the pressure of business, legislators
generally seek to hit only the high point of an issue. They have neither
the time, nor the resources, nor the inclination to conduct long, detailed
and possibly fruitless inquiries. The agencies kno-w this and act accordingly. Part of their approach is to deny and delay without explicitly refusing. But there is a fine line between this and overt obstructionism. Usually, the last thing an agency wants is to anger a Senator
45. The subcommittee staff was also aware of comments of senior officers in Army
Intelligence to the effect that the investigation was a transitory political "flap" and that
once the controversy receded, they could resume the surveillance.
46. Letter from Fred Buzhardt to Sam Ervin, Mar. 9, 1971, in i97i Hearings,supra

note 5, at 1217.
47. Letter from Melvin Laird to Sam Ervn, Apr. 19, 1971, in 597r Hearings at
1225, 1226. The written correspondence was supplemented by many personal exchanges

between Buzhardt and the subcommittee staff.
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or to allow things to deteriorate to a final refusal and confrontation
Laird's statement that he, rather than the subcommittee chairman, would
determine what was appropriate, exhausted Ervin's patience and convinced him that strong measures would probably be necessary. 8
While the issue was first joined on the question of the generals'
appearance, by spring other events had served to make their appearance
less important as a means of securing the needed testimony. First, it
became clear that new hearings so soon after the last were not advisable.
Second, the subcommittee had received a mass of documentary evidence
through the Justice Department and Rehnquist's intercession. This
evidence had been analyzed by the staff in a documentary report which,
far more than anything else thus far, showed the nature, extent-and
worthlessness-of the surveillance. Finally, the subcommittee had come
upon a "secret agent in place"-a member of the intelligence branch still
in uniform and working within the Pentagon office directly concerned
with the subcommittee investigation.4" This man had managed to provide the subcommittee with a wealth of information which vastly increased its knowledge of the entire program. As a result, Ervin was
by this time more interested in getting the staff report declassified and
getting the subcommittee's new information confirmed officially by the
Department.
A copy of the proposed report was sent to Buzhardt for declassification in May 1971, and the Department replied on June 9.5" Buzhardt
listed six reasons why it could not be declassified. Most of the reasons
went to substance: it was incorrect, outdated, incomplete, and so
forth. Only three reasons were advanced which had any relevance to
the declassification issue. First, there was pending civil litigation;
second, the report mentioned the names of individuals whose privacy
would thereby be impaired; and third, the Department had given the
documents with a reservation on their public use.
Senator Ervin felt the first was irrelevant to the right of a legislative committee to publish a report. The second problem was mooted
by the fact that these individuals and groups had already been publicly
identified as subjects of surveillance. In any case, that was not a valid
48. Ervin directed the staff in April 1971 to prepare subpoenas for the missing
witnesses, but decided there was insufficient political support for their issuance.
49. Dubbed "Yellow-pants," this serviceman kept the staff fully informed of developments in the Army during the first half of 1971. His alias was not well-chosen
since he had a habit of wearing yellow slacks while off-duty and so might have been
identified by his military associates.
50. Letter from Lawrence Baskir to Fred Buzhardt, May 3, 1971, and reply of
June 9, 1971, in 1971 Hearings,supra note 5, at 1227, 1228.
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reason for a national security classification. In fact, there was more
than a little irony in the Defense Department defending the privacy
of the people upon whom it had spied. The third reason was, of course,
the reason why Ervin had written for consent in the first place.
Ervin continued to pressure the Department for cooperation. By
mid-summer, his concern with executive secrecy had expanded beyond
this one example relating to the subcommittee investigation. There
had been growing discontent in Congress with the Executive's increasing
refusals to deal with Congress. Ervin decided the issue needed exploration in a broader context. In part at the insistence of Senator Fulbright,
whose Foreign Relations Committee had been frustrated in its efforts to
get Presidential Advisor Henry Kissinger to appear at hearings, Ervin
decided to use his other Judiciary Subcommittee, Separation of Powers,
to hold general hearings on a variety of executive secrecy issues. 5 1
These hearings gave Ervin an opportunity to apply additional political
pressure for Defense Department cooperation. Among the witnesses
was Buzhardt, who was subjected to a severe public examination about
his failures to provide Ervin with what he wanted. "
A second witness was Senator- John Tunney, a junior member of
the Constitutional Rights Subcommittee. In cooperation with the Constitutional Rights staff, Tunney presented a comprehensive review of
the Subcommittee's difficulties with the Defense Department.5" Although
there was a certain unreality in having Tunney tell Ervin -atone hearing
what Ervin had been doing in another subcommittee, it was no different
from a staged colloquy on the Senate floor. The hearing served its purpose in giving Ervin a public forum to pursue his case, to bring additional public exposure to the Department's obstinancy and to provide a
foundation for any further steps that might prove necessary.
The Department, however, remained firm. By the fall of 1971,
Ervin, frustrated by the persistent failure to deliver the requested documents, or to have the materials in his possession declassified, or to get
clearance for the staff report, decided to issue his first ultimatum. In
a letter to Secretary Laird he reviewed the course of the unsuccessful
efforts thus far and pointedly rejected each of the excuses or justi
51. Kissinger had become the senior official in charge of foreign policy, displacing
the then Secretary of State. The President claimed executive privilege to prevent Kissinger's appearance before the Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Fulbright. Fulbright introduced a bill to force an appearance. Hearings on S. 1125 Before the Subcom. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1971).
52. Id. at 443.
53. Id. at 381.
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fications that he had received. The Department's excuses were summarized in the letter:
[W]e are precluded by consistent Executive branch policy
from releasing to the public. (J. Fred Buzhardt, General
Counsel, Department of.Defense.)
Inappropriate to authorize the release of these documents.
(Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense.)
This information is solely for your use in conducting your
inquiry. (R. Kenly Webster, Acting General Counsel, Department of Army.)
The records .

.

.

cannot be obtained without an in-

ordinate expenditure of time and effort. (R. Kenly Webster,
Acting General Counsel, Department of Army.)
No useful purpose would be served by a public report on
the materials. . . (J. Fred Buzhardt, General Counsel, Department of Defense.)
I do not believe it appropriate that the general officers
in question appear before your Subcommittee, but that any
'desired testimony' . . . should be furnished by my designated

representative. (Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense.)"
To which Ervin replied:
If I were a suspicious person, I would draw the inference
that the Subcommittee has been given the 'runaround.' I
refrain, however, from so asserting.
I am constrained to say that if the Subcommittee postpones further action until the Department of Defense and the
Department of the Army manifests [sic] a willingness to
comply with the Subcommittee's request, the Subcommittee will
await such action in vain until the last lingering echo of
Gabriel's horn trembles into ultimate silence."
Ervin then said that if the documents and other responses were
not forthcoming, he would have to introduce a resolution in the Senate
on these matters, which would condemn the surveillance program from
54. i97t Hearings at 1265.

At one point, Buzhardt "resolved" months of dispute about access to an Army investigative report by inviting the staff to review the material in his office. Once there,
the staff was treated to a three-hour monologue of charm and anecdote. By the end of
the performance, the reports, sitting on an adjacent table, had not been cracked.

were never made available again.
55. Id.

They
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a constitutional perspective and authorize the chairman ta seek 'subpoenas. Ervin thoughtfully enclosed a copy of the draft resolution. "
In the Watergate era, we are now accustomed to have subpoenas
flow from Congress to executive branch. But in those more innocent
days, the issuance of a congressional subpoena for information from
an executive officer was highly unusual. The subcommittee's quick
search had not disclosed a recent precedent for one in these circumstances. While the subpoena weapon has always existed, and is very
effective, in recent times Congress had just not seen fit to exercise it.
To understand this, it is necessary to recall that the issue of
executive privilege and withholding of information from Congress
has only recently come to a head. In the false sense of comity that had
served to rationalize Congress' unwillingness and inability to assert
itself against executive secrecy, the subpoenaing of documents from the
executive branch was just "not done." That Ervin, after a year or
more of frustration, was finally driven to threaten the subpoena shows
not only how far he had been pushed, but what it took to provoke a
legislator finally to flex his muscles. The experience with the Army, or
more precisely with Buzhardt and the Defense Department, was perhaps
the first serious skirmish in a conflict that later spread throughout
Congress.
Ervin's letter did not specify a time limit. As ultimatums go, and
certainly as recent events show, it was a relatively mild threat. But it
did have some results. After more communications with the Department in January, Buzhardt finally delivered a set of documents comprising a portion, though by no means a great proportion, of the missing
materials." This delivery served as the grounds for a tacit resolution
of part of the controversy.
The subcommittee had by now a great deal of information from
many sources. A full year had just about passed since its hearings,
and almost two years since the investigation began. It was long since
time for the subcommittee to produce-some concrete results. While the
missing information was still important, the passing of time had become
more important. Despite staff importunings, Ervin decided that he
could not and would not press the Department for further information.
This left only one issue outstanding-declassifying the staff report
and the materials it had drawn upon. This effort continued during the
early part of the spring of 1972. By this time, the report had been sub56. Id.
57.

The delivery to Ervin was made by Buzhardt personally.
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stantially revised. Still, no reply had been forthcoming to the request
for clearance. Faced again with this frustrating lack of response, Ervin
wrote once more to Laird."
This time he enclosed a copy of his
revised resolution which now stated that all materials pertaining to
the discredited and halted Army surveillance program were, in the
Senate's judgment, no longer, if ever, properly classified for national
security purposes. It declared them unclassified and permitted anyone
in possession to make them available to the Senate or the public.
The resolution would have proved a serious political embarrassment
to the Department and the Administration since it accused them of still
covering up even after two years of public statements disavowing the
spying. But it was also an unprecedented effort to establish a process
of declassification by legislative proclamation. Such a step would have
been a major blow to the consistent executive tradition that it alone
has the power to adjudge what is necessary for national security and
what must be classified on those grounds.
Irrespective of the legal issue raised by Senator Ervin's proposed
resolution, there was little doubt in his mind or in the Department's
that it would have passed quickly and possibly unanimously. Once
asserted, such a legislative power might have untold consequences in the
future. This time he set a time limit of a bare week. Before the week
was out, the Department sent up a legal officer who read both the staff
report and the draft committee report. It took him an hour and a
quarter. When he emerged, he pronounced them no danger to national
security and, accordingly, free from classification. That ended fifteen
months of effort. With the publication of the two reports in the following
months, the investigation of Army surveillance ended. By this time,
preliminary efforts were underway towards establishing another Ervin
committee to examine Watergate and a vastly greater range of government surveillance.
The long investigation conducted by the subcommittee shows
how chance and circumstance can affect the oversight function. It
also underlines the importance of establishing firm public and political
support as an aid in pursuing an inquiry. Without public pressure, and
the assistance of the press which stimulates it, reluctant government
agencies can resist more easily the demands of legislators for information.
58. Ervin's letter was written by him personally and was not placed in the subcommittee files although its substance was reported to the subcommittee staff. Correspondence subsequent to January 1972 was not published in the hearings. With the
exception of the above mentioned letter all other letters remain in the subcommittee files.
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The importance of psychology in such an inquiry also is evident.
Quite clearly, Buzhardt's function was to terminate the investigation
as quickly as possible and with the minimum of political embarrassment
to the Department and the Administration. In fulfilling this task, he
sought to wear down the patience of his adversaries without giving
them a tangible provocation. Letters were ignored, promises were made
and forgotten, arguments were provoked, irrelevancies were debated.
Such tactics tend to be overshadowed by the popular legal debate
over executive privilege. Despite the recent increase in the use of this
technique, it arises in only a very small portion of the disputes over
legislative access to executive information. Far more often, less formal
claims of secrecy, unavailability, lack of need, or other arguments are
asserted. Since most legislative investigations depend upon correspondence, they are long and often tedious affairs. This enables the executive
agency to exhaust all but the most persistent inquisitors.
LITIGATING MILITARY SURVEILLANCE

The American system of public jurisprudence is unique in the world
in at least one respect: Americans have a tendency to transform issues
of public policy into questions of law and to present them for decision by
judges. If this is a tendency which has grown in extraordinary degree
in recent decades, it is by no means a new phenomenon. Marbury v.
Madison " itself was a politically inspired test of the Jeffersonians'
effort to block the loading of the federal courts by John Adams (and
Marshall) in their famous "midnight appointments."
Fully consistent with this time-honored American tradition, within
days of the publication of the original Pyle article, the ACLU put
together some plaintiffs, drafted a complaint and filed suit in the District
of Columbia District Court."0 While the ACLU was primarily interested
in an adjudication of the constitutional issue of Army surveillance, there
was another aspect of their case which was of direct interest to the
subcommittee. Tatum v. Laird sought substantial discovery from
the Army about its surveillance activities. A full public exposure of
Army activities was essential to the creation of a firm public condemnation of political surveillance and would also be of tremendous help to
the subcommittee's own investigatory efforts.
The lawsuit met with a rapid rebuff when the trial judge denied
the request for a preliminary injunction, denied permission to proceed
59. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
60. Tatum v. Laird, Civil No. 459-70 (D.D.C., Apr. 29, 1970), rev'd, 444 F.2d 947
(D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
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with discovery, and granted a government motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. He did so in little more than
the time it takes to report these facts."'
There may have been many reasons why Judge Hart was not impressed with the seriousness of the plaintiffs' case. One reason certainly
was the paucity of data the plaintiffs could advance on the scope and
nature of the Army program. When the case was filed, there was no
knowledge of the kinds of data the Army had been collecting, nor their
sources. All that was known, essentially, was that the Army had been
collecting data from public sources. The plaintiffs had available witnesses to support their allegations, but the judge declined even to hear
them. To Judge Hart, as to many others, the program involved no
more than a group of Keystone Cops engaged in a constitutionally harmless waste of taxpayer money.62
The case was duly appealed to the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals.6" By the time the court decision was rendered on April 27,
1971, one weakness in the case, at least, had been remedied: a considerable amount of additional evidence had gone into the public, if not
the formal court, record. The subcommittee had held its hearings, and
the country had been subjected for over a year to press stories and public
exposds. The appellate court's reversal of Judge Hart's dismissal came
as a welcome surprise to the plaintiffs and their supporters. The District
of Columbia bench, while generally considered among the most liberal in
the federal system, has its conservative members as well, and the luck of
the draw had not produced three who would automatically sympathize
with the plaintiffs. Indeed, two of them, Judges Wilkey and MacKinnon,
were considered in the conservative column. Despite this, the plaintiffs
were fully supported by two judges, and even the dissent was only
partial.
Judge Wilkey addressed directly the question of legal injury, which
was the main jurisdictional hurdle in the case. The plaintiffs had alleged
61. Tatum v. Laird, Civil No. 459-70 (D.D.C., Apr. 29, 1970). The transcript of
the district court hearings occupies less than five pages in the Joint Appendix to Briefs
of Petitioner and Respondent, at 122-26, Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
62. A related case, brought a year later in Chicago in the wake of the O'Brien
disclosures was dismissed by the presiding judge after an evidentiary hearing with the
following commentary:
The chief beneficiary of military intelligence has been newspaper circulation.
The chief menace has been the increase in air pollution from burning newspapers from which has been extracted, for dossiers, valuable secretive bits of
common knowledge available to all who can read.
ACLU v. Laird, Civil No. 71-1159 (N.D. Ill., Jan. 5, 1971) (per Austin, J.).
63. Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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no concrete harm from the surveillance of which they were the victims:
no loss of job, no threat of legal sanction, no loss of benefit for exercising
constitutional rights, no compulsion to provide constitutionally-protected
information, and, of course, no threatened public embarrassment by
government publication of personal information. Nonetheless, Judge
Wilkey agreed that the existence of a system of improper surveillance was
itself a sufficient claim of present harm to first amendment rights to
warrant trial and a decision on the merits. Buttressing this was the
fact that here was no likelihood that the issue would ever be more ripe
for testing.64 Judge Wilkey held that a government action, not otherwise justified, which impaired first amendment rights was justiciable and
that the plaintiffs need not show additional consequential harm. In
common constitutional parlance, a government action which "chilled"
first amendment rights was justiciable."5
An important element of Judge Wilkey's opinion was the ultra
vires nature of the Army's program. Political surveillance was a
function which the government should conduct, if at all, through duly
authorized civil agencies. At the core of the judge's view was the
belief, held by conservatives no less than liberals, that the military
should be kept out of domestic political affairs.6 6
Reversals of dismissals for failure to state a cause of action usually
go no further than the court of appeals. For one thing, economy of litigation dictates that the Supreme Court should not have to bother with
an appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss which, if upheld, may
still not result in suc cess by the plaintiffs at trial. And if the plaintiffs
are successful, the issue would still be available for review on appeal.
Thus, it was quite unusual for the Court to accept the petition for certiorari presented by the government.
What was more curious was the fact that the ACLU did not
vigorously challenge the government's petition on these procedural
grounds. In their brief in opposition to the government's writ, the
ACLU argued primarily that the lower court's decision was proper on
the merits, and so did not require Supreme Court review.67 While the
64. Id. at 947, 953-56.
65. Id. at 956.
66. [T]o permit the military to exercise a totally unrestricted investigative
function in regard to civilians, divorced from the normal restrictions of legal
process and the courts, and necessarily coupling sensitive information with military power, could create a dangerous situation in the Republic.
Id. at 958.
67. Id., cert. granted, 404 U.S. 955 (1971).

There was also some perplexity about why the government chose to risk an adverse
constitutional ruling in preference to a long procedural battle in discovery proceedings
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ACLU was not enthusiastic about Supreme Court review, it apparently
viewed the prospect with mixed emotions. The appeal to the Supreme
Court short-circuited what would otherwise have been a long and chancy
road to an adjudication of the constitutional issue. While a decision in
the plaintiffs' favor might not have been a conclusive ruling on the
constitutional issues, still it would have satisfied the question of whether
a program of this type was a proper subject of constitutional challenge.
In this case, at least, the ACLU attorneys seemed more familiar
with constitutional law than with the fine points of litigation strategy
or procedural law. They were much more at home in the Supreme Court
arguing the constitutional aspects of the case than they would have
been back in district court conducting long and complicated discovery
and a trial of the factual issues. The ACLU briefs and arguments
reflected this predilection.68
From the perspective of the subcommittee staff, the priorities were
clearly on the side of further discovery. What the subcommittee wanted
was assistance in developing its legislative case. The hearings had
produced a nearly unanimous condemnation of the practice from all
points on the political spectrum. A formal constitutional decision was
not nearly as important to the subcommittee as was the creation of a firm
political tradition that such surveillance was against the public understanding of the constitutional role of the military.
However, once the Supreme Court accepted certiorari, discussions
ensued between the plaintiffs' lawyers and Senator Ervin's staff about
the role Ervin might play in the case. Senator Ervin was approached by
a number of religious organizations, each of which had been engaged
in social or political action on issues which had been the subject of Army
surveillance. They asked Ervin to represent them as amici in the
case.69 Because of the importance he saw in this surveillance issue, he
decided to participate in the case. In the distant past, it was a common
practice for legislators to argue before the Supreme Court, but this
which, even if successful, would have largely duplicated what was by then already on
the public record. In fact, it appeared that the Department of Justice was more interested in appealing than the Army. One possible explanation is that the Department of
Justice feared pretrial discovery might uncover other government intelligence programs,
such as the Huston Plan, which have subsequently come to light.
68. For example, on the merits, the plaintiffs noted only that in deciding a FED. R.
Civ. P. 12(b) (6) motion the defendants' affidavits should be disregarded, that the plaintiffs' allegations must be taken as fact, and that the complaint must be broadly construed
in the plaintiffs' favor. They did not argue the inappropriateness of granting the writ.
Brief for Respondents at 9 n.11, 11 n.12, Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
69. Ervin appeared as counsel for the Unitarian-Universalist Association, the Council for Christian Social Action of the United Church of Christ, the American Friends
Service Committee, and the National Council of Churches of Christ.
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practice has fallen into disuse in recent decades. In part, this may be
a reflection of the change in the composition of the Senate from the days
when great orators and lawyers continued to have an active private
practice even after they became legislators. In any case, in recent years,
only Senator Ervin has argued in the Supreme Court while a member
of Congress.71
Ervin's brief stressed the constitutional issues, arguing that the
surveillance program had a direct impact on first amendment rights and
that there was no countervailing government interest which would
justify the program. From a narrow point of view, this approach was
inappropriate. The question at issue was one of standing and justiciability, not the constitutional merits. But if the Court could be persuaded
that Army surveillance was a constitutional violation, it would be far
more ready to reach a favorable conclusion on the jurisdictional issues.
Ervin, representing amici, had more leeway to slide over this theoretical
distinction.
There were two other advantages to Ervin's brief. First, the
ACLU was intent on establishing the principle of the "chilling effect"
as a viable constitutional doctrine; accordingly, its brief contained an
extended appendix of 40 pages of social science data seeking to show
that intrusive government action discourages the exercise of first amendment rights. Ervin, as well as many other constitutional authorities,
thought the "chilling effect" doctrine had little support in Court precedent, and was not a winning strategy. Second, Ervin's participation
provided an opportunity to enlarge the record before the Court. Because
the case had been filed a few short weeks after Army surveillance was
first uncovered, the record did not have the benefit of all the discoveries
and developments of the succeeding two years, including the hearings.
Ervin could draw on this history to flush out the factual case since he
personified the legislative investigations of the subcommittee. To make
doubly certain that the Court was aware of this record, Ervin submitted
71
as an appendix the full printed record of the hearings.
70. Ervin had previously appeared as counsel for amicus arguing the justiciability
of challenges to federal aid to religious education, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) ;
as coujsel for the Senate in Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) ; and as counsel
for certain stockholders in Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S.

263 (1965).
71. The plaintiffs and their allies were not the only ones to expand the official
record in their presentation to the Court. The Government in its brief drew heavily on
statements issued by the DOD in the period following the filing of the suit. See geterally
Brief for Petitioners, Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972). Plaintiffs took issue with
many of the government's factual assertions, especially those to the effect that the pro-

gram had halted. Brief for Respondents at 88-91, Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
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The government stressed "uncontroverted evidence" of the following: the limited scope of the surveillance, its legitimacy, and the cessation of the program. The government used these latter claims to argue
mootness. All these assertions of fact were controverted by the plaintiffs'
allegations. Neither side's view of the factual case was subjected to the
judicial tests of an evidentiary trial.
To those who are bemused by this transformation of a challenige
to the legal sufficiency of a complaint into a test of constitutionality and
a trial on the merits, one can only reply that Supreme Court litigation, at
least in this case, is not quite the same in real life as it might appear
from reading the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Consider that the
Court, in holding against the plaintiffs, relied heavily on the government's allegations of facts that the plaintiffs vigorously disputed."2
The decision of the Court was rendered on June 26, 1972; Chief
Justice Burger, speaking for a five-man majority, reversed the court of
appeals.73 The Burger opinion went to the heart of the question of
whether the existence of surveillance alone was reason enough to
enable a subject of the program to challenge it. The Chief Justice
said no, holding that the plaintiffs had to show some other concrete
harm-presumably something such as threat of sanction or loss of
employment-before suing."
The decision is a fundamental statement on the ability of citizens
to challenge unconstitutional government action. An alleged constitutional violation is itself not necessarily sufficient injury to obtain legal
redress, even when government's conduct is directed at specific plaintiffs.
There must be more, perhaps a pecuniary loss or some other consequential, tangible hurt."5 This reduces constitutional liberties to a
scale far below loss of money or property. One would think that the
infringement of a citizen's constitutionally guaranteed right would
itself be cause enough to afford him standing, and that some other, more
prosaic harm would not be needed.
72. In a petition for rehearing the plaintiffs challenged five assertions of fact that
the Supreme Court relied upon: (1) that most of the intelligence was "essentially"
about civil disturbance events; (2) that the "principal sources of information" were the
(4) that the
media; (3) that the program "hardly merits description as 'massive;'
blacklist and data bank records had been destroyed; and (5) that Army domestic intelligence activities had been "significantly reduced." Petition for Rehearing at 4-11, Laird
v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, reh. denied, 409 U.S. 901 (1972).
73. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), rezlg 444 F.2d 947 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
74. Id. at 13-14.
75. In another case, government-required record keeping by banks of depositors'
transactions was challenged as a violation of the right to privacy, but the argument was
rejected by the Court as premature in the absence of improper use by the government.
California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 94 S. Ct. 1494 (1974).
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Although the issue is not clearly elaborated in the Court's opinion,
there is a suggestion that the plaintiffs' claim of constitutional injury
was not sufficiently corroborated to give them personal standing. Thus,
the opinion argues in a footnote that the plaintiffs had conceded they were
not actually "chilled." 7' 6 Accordingly, they did not, in fact, suffer the harm
they alleged and so were not proper parties to bring the challenge. To
the extent that this concession determined the Court's decision of the
case, it presents a "Catch 22" dilemma. Those who are truly chilled
will not sue, since obviously they do not wish to compound any reluctance
they feel about being targets of a surveillance program. Those who do
sue, contrariwise, must be conceding that they are not chilled. Except
for the possibility of a John Doe, it is hard to imagine a proper plaintiff
for the Tatum case.
Surveillance and intelligence activities by their very nature are
secret, do not rely upon legal compulsion for gathering information,
and do not have as their objective the imposition of any legal or other
kind of sanction. Because the nature of surveillance programs is such
that the more direct, tangible kinds of injury the Court requires are
never going to be present, in effect the Burger opinion gives legal
immunity, if not sanction, to all such programs. In light of the increasing concern with government intelligence programs, the Tatum decision
is a serious impediment to judicial control and oversight of program
operations and possible excesses.
In addition to the legal controversies spurred by the case, the decision created even more dispute on another count. Casting the deciding
vote was the Court's newest member, William Rehnquist. Without his
vote, a 4-4 decision would have reaffirmed the court of appeals decision
and kept the litigation alive. Justice Rehnquist's participation came
as a surprise to the plaintiffs and their associates. His nomination had
been bitterly contested in the Senate by liberals who objected to his
political outlook and his consistent defense of administration and Justice
Department policies. Ervin, however, had resisted pleas to join this opposition. While he disagreed with Rehnquist's views, he thought
them honestly held and was not about to oppose a nominee solely because
of differences with his legal position. Ervin was also attracted to the
nominee because Rehnquist, unique within the Justice Department, had
76. 408 U.S. at 13 n.7.
77. Mr. Rehnquist reversed the Department's opposition to an Ervin bill on speedy
trial, and testified in support of the need for such legislation. Hearings on S. 895 Before
the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 94 (1971). With his departure, the Department reverted to its former stand.
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been unusually candid and forthcoming in his dealings with the Senator.
On a number of issues, he had shown himself ready to consider Ervin's
views and positions on their merits and did not disregard or reject them
out-of-hand as did other officials in the Department. This direct dealing
resulted in Rehnquist's persuading the Department to take a more affirmative approach to some of Ervin's legislative proposals.77
In no matter was this more true than in the subcommittee's investigation of Army surveillance. Rehnquist was the principal witness for
the Justice Department at those hearings and was the spokesman for the
executive branch on its legal position." He defended the constitutionality
and authority of the government's surveillance function in general, with
particular reference to military surveillance."9 In effect, Rehnquist was
the Justice Department and executive branch legal spokesman in the
public and legislative debates surrounding these issues. In addition to
his precise legal defense in congressional hearings, he also made many
public addresses defending the constitutionality and propriety of the
Administration's conduct. The Government, of course, argues its legal
cases in many forums besides the courts. Except for the latter, Rehnquist
was the government's chief defense attorney for this controversy."
His role, however, was even more extensive than that of legal
counsel for military surveillance in the court of public opinion. Because
of the Tatum case and similar litigation in the federal court in Chicago,"'
the Justice Department had to coordinate both its legislative and litigation efforts. Evidentiary material related to Army surveillance was
given to the Justice Department. As the officer in charge, the Assistant
Attorney General became the person to deal with when the subcommittee
wished additional information. It was through his authority that the
subcommittee staff was permitted to examine some of the voluminous
printouts and other documentary material which the Justice Department
had received from the DOD. The staff examination was arranged and
conducted according to ground rules determined by him. When the subcommittee requested custody of these materials, it was done through
Rehnquist, and it was by his decision that the materials were delivered."2
78.

z97. Hearings,supra note 5, at 597, 849.
79. Id. at 801, passhn. Mr. Rehnquist offered the view that plaintiffs as in the
Tatuin case had suffered no harm or violation of first amendments rights, and so had no
legal challenge. Id. at 864-65.
80. Mr. Rehnquist's speeches included at least three. They are cited in the Plaintiffs' Motion to Withdraw Opinion of the Court at 7, nn.6-8, Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S.
1, -wtion denied, 409 U.S. 824 (1972).
81. See note 62 supra.
82. Letter from William Rehnquist to Sam Ervin, Mar. 18, 1971, in 1971 Hearings,

supra note 5, at 1370.
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At the same time, it was Rehnquist who was charged with the
responsibility of developing the government's legal rationale and defense. He personally prepared the formal testimony he delivered,
debated with the subcommittee chairman and other members on points of
law on his o.wn authority; and later, in response to a request by the
ranking Republican, prepared and delivered a legal memorandum on
the government's constitutional authority to conduct surveillance.8"
Rehnquist's responsibilities in the legal defense of Army surveillance was, of course, well known to the other parties to the public controversy when the Tatum case was appealed to the Supreme Court. The
question naturally arose as to what role he would now play as a Justice.
The general conclusion was that he would obviously not participate.
On this basis, suggestions that the parties raise the issue in advance of
argument were not seriously considered. By the same token, a question
arose as to the propriety of including in Ervin's brief a favorable quotation from Rehnquist's testimony before the subcommittee.84 Ervin did
not think it would be regarded as a personal appeal to one of the deciding
Justices, since it was "obvious" he would not participate.
After the case was argued, the ACLU proposed submitting a
motion challenging Rehnquist's right to sit. Ervin, however, refused
to join. He recalled an earlier case in which a Justice sat to hear argument and even interrogated counsel, but then did not participate in the
Court's deliberations. Despite the arguments of his staff and the other
counsel, Ervin could not believe that the Justice would act differently than
his predecessor. It was natural, he felt, that Rehnquist should want
to hear the argument on an issue he had been so closely concerned with
while at the Justice Department.
It came as a total surprise to Ervin when the opinion came down
with Justice Rehnquist casting the deciding vote supporting the government's position on constitutionality. Ervin was so outraged that he
agreed to a public statement severely criticizing the Justice for deciding a
case in which he, as an attorney for the government, had been so personally and professionally interested. Having authorized the statement,
Ervin soon changed his mind. He was not only an attorney in the case
but a Senator. Making a personal attack on another public official, no
matter how provoked he might be, violated his consistent rule o.f avoiding
83. See memorandum on the first amendment and government information collection activities, in 1971 Hearings at 1407.
84. While there is obviously no justification for surveillance of any kind that

does not relate to a legitimate investigative purpose, the vice is not surveillance
per se, but surveillance of activities which are none of the Government's business.
1971 Hearings at 601.
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personal attacks. Then, too, the ACLU had decided to file a recusal
motion against Justice Rehnquist together with a petition for rehearing.
It was, by the plaintiffs' research, only the second time a formal motion
for recusal of a Supreme Court Justice had been presented by a party
to a case. 5 Once again, Ervin believed that the Justice would withdraw
voluntarily in the face of the motion. Once again, he was wrong.
The pattern was repeated when Justice Rehnquist rejected the
recusal motion and issued a long memorandum justifying his view
that no conflict of interest was involved.8" Ervin was angered by what
he viewed as the strained, opaque, an mechanistic interpretations of the
conflict of interest canons and statute, and the principles they sought
to express even more than by the original participation. Having read
the memorandum, Ervin dictated a strong public statement. This time
he was dissuaded by his staff, which used the same arguments that
Ervin himself had made a few weeks before. While Ervin formally remained silent, his view of Rehnquist changed dramatically. He subsequently expressed, on a number of occasions, his belief that he had made
a tragic mistake in supporting the nomination.
There are still some aspects of Rehnquist's role which have subsequently come to light but which have not yet been fully explored.
There are indications that his, involvement predates the legislative hearings of March 1971, and even the litigation that began in early 1970.
To provide the context, it is necessary to refer to some of the internal
disputes over Army surveillance that raged long before the issue came
to public attention. Late in 1968, the General Counsel's office of the Department of the Army awoke to some of the controversial details of
the Army's civil disturbance activities when it received a request from
the Justice Department for video tapes of TV interviews conducted by
Mid-West News, the Army's undercover TV unit for surveillance.87 The
Department of Justice wanted the tapes, which contained interviews
with some leaders of the 1968 demonstrations at the Chicago Democratic
Convention, for its conspiracy case against the Chicago Seven.
Upon learning of this request, the Army Secretariat realized, for
the first time, that the Army's intelligence activities were far more
extensive than they had been led to believe. These civilian officials then at85. The plaintiffs' petition for rehearing did not raise the question of Justice Rehnquist's participation. The question was presented in the plaintiffs' Motion to Withdraw
Opinion of the Court at 9 n.14, Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), motion denied, 409
U.S. 824 (1972).
86. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972) (Memorandum of Rehnquist, J.).
87. This history appears more fully in the 1972 REPORT, supra note 13, at 84.
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tempted to halt all military surveillance."8 The effort extended into the
new year and the new administration. At the same time the Nixon
administration was especially concerned about inadequacies in the government's response to civil disturbances. The President charged the Justice
Department with improving planning and intelligence, and with coordinating the different government departments. This effort took the form
of an Interdepartmental Action Plan for Civil Disturbances, which was
eventually approved by the President in April 1969.89
The Army civilians welcomed this development as a means of
getting their department out of civilian intelligence. Their draft plan expressly stated that intelligence was a responsibility of the civilian
agencies. It said that the military should not perform the function
because of traditional rules which bar military interference in civilian
political life. The language of the original Army draft sent to the
Justice Department deserves to be quoted:
We believe that the Federal Bureau of Investigation
should be formally assigned primary responsibility for collecting, and furnishing on a timely basis to other concerned
agencies, raw intelligence. Although the Army Intelligence
Command could perform this function, the salutary tradition of
avoiding military intelligence collection activities in predominantly civilian matters reinforces our view that this
responsibility belongs with the FBI.9"
The contrast between this draft and the final language is instructive.
As finally approved, the Plan makes no reference to the allocation of
the intelligence responsibility. The corresponding phrase reads in full:
Under the supervision of the Attorney General, raw
intelligence data pertaining to civil disturbances will be required
from such sources of the Government as may be available.9'
Thus, the record shows clearly that although the Nixon administration only inherited the surveillance program, it had more than a passive and unsuspecting role in approving and continuing the program.
The responsible Justice Department officials were squarely faced with
88.

1971

of Defense).
89.

Hearingsat 392-95 (statement of Robert F. Froehike, Assistant Secretary

T974 Hearings,supra note 1, at 346-53.

90. Id. at 332-33. An earlier internal Army draft never sent to the Justice Departmeat refers to the "inadvisability" of extensive military intelligence activities in the
civilian community (strike) sphere." Id. at 324.
91. Id. at 348.
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the constitutional issue presented by the Army language. Just as firmly,
they rejected the efforts of the military officials to halt Army involvement, and, in so doing, they rejected the constitutional issue which the
Army raised to support its effort to withdraw.
Rehnquist's involvement in this decision is less dear. His Office
of Legal Counsel was charged with the work of preparing the Action
Plan. It was also the Justice Department office to which the Deputy.
Attorney General had delegated responsibility for cooardinating work
with other agencies. Quite clearly a dispute arose between the departments of Justice and Defense concerning the allocation of intelligence
responsibilities. The Defense representatives were unable to prevail
with their view and settled for the ambiguous language that resulted. In
a memorandum of recollection, the Army General Counsel stated that
intelligence was one of the two items in which he was unable to get
concurrence from the Department of Justice.92 In any case, Rehnquist
signed and approved the final draft which omitted the Army's desired
disclaimer. The extent to which Rehnquist personally participated in
the discussions concerning the military's proper role in civil disturbance
intelligence and surveillance and the extent to which he personally knew
and approved of the ultimate decision cannot be ascertained from the
cold print of the documents. To what extent he must take official responsibility for the 1969 decision determining, in effect, that there are no
constitutional impediments to Army surveillance is open for debate. So,
too, is the question of whether this knowledge and this responsibility
were pertinent to Justice Rehnquist's decision to cast the deciding vote
in the Tatum case. Unfortunately, these points were not addressed in
his memorandum justifying that decision.
DRAFTING THE LEGISLATION

Although the opponents of Army surveillance lost the constitutional
battle in the courts, in a very real sense they have won the war. The
tradition of keeping the military out of civilian politics is only rarely
expressed in statutory and case law. It is, however, firmly rooted in
our unwritten constitutional law. The general public and political condemnation of Army surveillance served to reinforce this tradition, and
the Defense Department's issuance of prohibitory regulations has codified
this result.
In the first two years of the inquiry, there was much uncertainty
within the subcommittee staff as to the advisability of trying to codify a
92. Id. at 326.
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prohibition by statute. Much had been accomplished politically, and
the risks of defeat on a bill threatened to cloud the political gains. Indeed,
not only defeat, but anything short of success might be enough to encourage some future effort to reinstitute military surveillance. Nevertheless, for symbolic purposes, if nothing more, Senator Ervin drafted and
introduced such a bill in 1972." 3 Doubts about its fate were immediately
confirmed when the bill was referred to the Armed Services Committee,
which had never been particularly exercised by the revelations of the
recent past. There the bill quietly died with the 92d Congress.
Eight months later, with the growing public concern over governmental invasions of privacy, the expanding Watergate controversy, and
the increasing evidence of political surveillance by the executive branch,
Senator Ervin decided to push again for Army surveillance legislation.
lie directed the staff to redraft the bill for Judiciary Committee jurisdiction. By careful drafting of a bill's short title, by use of introductory
findings and purpose, and by an introductory speech, a bill's author has
great influence over its referral.
These techniques were used for S. 2318, which Ervin introduced
on August 1, 1973." The bill was indeed referred to the Judiciary
Committee, and to the Constitutional Rights Subcommittee. Illustrative of the support the issue had gained by then is the cosponsorship
it attracted. About one-third of the 37 cosponsoring Senators were
Republicans. So great was the support for the bill that for a long time
Senator Ervin considered reporting his bill to full committee without
hearings. This unusual approach is fraught with peril since opponents
can use arguments of procedural irregularity to stall the bill without
taking a stand against the merits.
Eventually, however, Ervin decided that a short hearing would not
only obviate this problem but have at least one other important advantage.
The 1971 hearings, as discussed earlier, did not hear from those in
positions of responsibility for the Army's civil disturbance activity.
Their testimony would have shed light on the usefulness and need for the
information that was collected. In 1971 these witnesses were still in
service and subject to Deparmental control. By 1974 many had left or
retired and were therefore much more accessible. Senator Ervin decided
93. S. 3750, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
94. 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1974). The short title describes S. 2318 as a bill to enforce
the first and fourth amendments and the constitutional rights of privacy. See note 4
supra. The bill amends title 18, the federal criminal code, and title 28 relating to civil
actions in the courts. Both titles are clearly within the Judiciary Committee's jurisdiction. S. 3750, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), was "free-floating" legislation prohibiting surveillance and could have been referred to either committee.
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that he would seek their testimony. In the end, Ervin's plan for a single
morning session barely could be accommodated in two days. The subcommittee received testimony from Robert Jordan, Army General
Counsel during the surveillance period, David McGiffert, Army Undersecretary at the time, and Cyrus Vance, former Deputy Secretary of
Defense. In addition, the subcommittee was fortunate in arranging for
the appearance of Colonel John Downie," who had been the senior professional intelligence officer in charge of the surveillance program. He
had wanted very much to present the military's professional opinion
back in 1971 but had been silenced by his civilian superiors. Each of
these witnesses condemned the political surveillance as wrong, without
value, and a waste of time. 6 Although they had suggestions and
criticisms respecting certain details of the bill, they supported its purpose in full. As experts on the military's role in suppressing violence,
they testified to the last remaining point that stood in the bill. The
DOD had no grounds left to argue upon.
A word- needs to be said about the Department's position. The
military had, of course, suffered greatly in public esteem from the
revelations of the 1970-71 investigation. "Army spying" entered the
public consciousness as a symbol of oppressive government invasions
of the first amendment. Despite the creation of a special agency in the
Secretary of Defense's office as a watchdog to prevent further surveillance, despite the issuance of a fairly effective regulation, and despite the
almost total absence of any evidence of a recurrence of the surveillance,
the public continued to be skeptical. The subcommittee regularly received
inquiries asking "whether the Army had stopped spying." Even though
the subcommittee had no evidence to disprove the official position, no
one was reassured. Both, in public and private comments, officials of the
Department expressed hurt and indignation over this persistent refusal
of the public to take them at their word.
The subcommittee staff had high hopes that the Department officials
would support the idea of legislation, if not necessarily the specifics of
the bill. The goal of the legislation was, after all, no different from the
intent of their own regulations. They professed no defense of past
practices, and did not indicate any desire to see the military surveillance
95. Former Director of Army Counterintelligence and Security.
96. See 1974 Hearings,supra note 1, at 14 (statement of Robert Jordan), 32 (statement of David McGiffert), 124 (statement of Cyrus Vance), and 38 (statement of Col.
John Downie). Hearings can be arranged to give an inaccurate picture of the support
for a bill. In this case, no witnesses wished to testify in opposition except for representatives of the Department of Defense.
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programs resumed in the future. In light of the widespread suspicion,
the subcommittee staff felt that the military could regain a great deal of
public respect if Defense Department officials supported a bill which
did little more than codify their own position. The staff had long talks
with officials of the Department, but to no avail. All offers to frame a
final bill in cooperation with the Department proved fruitless. The Department's representatives could give no convincing argument why they
opposed the bill, but they remained unmoved. 7
Unfortunately, this is a fairly common reaction of government
agencies. There is an inherent resistance to having Congress put in
legislative form policies already accepted within an executive agency.
The explanation can only lie in a deep-seated aversion to conceding any
congressional interference with the administrative discretion and
authority that agencies wish to exercise. It is an instinctive reaction,
grounded in the desire by agency officials to preserve their independence
from congressional oversight and the desire to keep exclusive control
over their own decisionmaking processes. This reaction can only be
countered by senior political leaders, who presumably recognize that
higher self-interest may sometimes be served by a public expression of
cooperation. In this instance, only the Secretary of Defense or the Defense General Counsel could have made the decision. The Secretary may
not have been concerned with this relatively narrow issue, but his subordinates were not in a position to assume the risk of making a "high
political" decision.
The failure of the Department to accept the inevitable was a disappointment, but not a serious setback to the legislation. The bill was
quickly polished in light of the technical points raised in the hearings,
and was circulated for approval to the other subcommittee members. 8
It remained, in substance, as it was originally designed in June 1972. It
provides for criminal penalties for any use of the military to conduct
political surveillance on American citizens; it contains savings clauses to
reconcile the prohibition with certain of the military's legitimate investigative responsibilities which might otherwise be regarded as affected by
the prohibition; and it provides for private civil enforcement by legislatively correcting the standing defect found by the Supreme Court in the
Tatum case.
97. The Department argued that the bill was unnecessary, that it would interfere
with authorized functions and that it presented insuperable drafting difficulties. See testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Cooke, 1974 Hearings, supra note 1, at
103, 104, 107; see also note 1 supra.
98. Memorandum from Sam Ervin to Members of the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, May 6, 1974.
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Barring developments in the remaining months of this Congress
which might interfere with the further progress of the bill, it seems fairly
well assured that it will be speedily adopted by the Senate. Its fate in
the House is more uncertain. However, there is a good chance that the
subcommittee's investigation which began in 1970 will be capped by the
enactment of the legislation,9 9 If so, it will represent the first small step
towards imposing legislative controls on the political intelligence activities
of the government.
CONCLUSION

All legislative investigations are in some respects sui generis. This
one was unique in many ways, not the least of which was the fact that it
proved overwhelmingly successful. The subcommittee, so far as can be
determined in retrospect, made no major errors of fact or assumption.
Essentially all the allegations proved to be true. Informal conversations
with knowledgeable Pentagon officials have subsequently satigfied the subcommittee staff that the investigation proved better (or luckier) than
anyone could have hoped when it started in 1970.
One reason was that the Defense Department at no time attempted to
defend the program on the merits or to make it a partisan issue. Had it
done so, the investigation might well have been stalled ihendless political
disputes and would never have produced much factual information. The
danger of this was evident since almost one-third of the subcommittee
members are conservatives who might have been tempted to defend
the Army and its program. This was avoided, first, because Senator
Ervin was uniquely capable of avoiding an ideological cast to the investigation. Second, the issue was one which crossed party lines, the
program having been initiated during a Democratic administration and
continued under a Republican one. Finally, the civilian leaders of the
Department and some of the senior military intelligence officers disapproved strongly of the program and wished, themselves, to have it
halted.
Another factor in the success of the investigation was the ability
of the subcommittee to conduct its inquiry independent of the information being supplied officially by the military. Except for those relatively
few legislative committees that have their own investigative staff, most
99. Since this article was written, it has become apparent that this prognosis was
overly optimistic. As of mid-October, the bill was still held up in the Judiciary Committee by Senators acting on behalf of the Defense Department. Its fate now seems to
hinge on whether the Committee will hold more meetings before the fast approaching
end of the term.
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oversight work in Congress must rely heavily on the information which
the government agency can be required to produce. This leaves legislative
aversight dependent, in large part, on the cooperation of the agency
being investigated, and it goes without saying that the agency under
examination will rarely be an enthusiastic partner. The Constitutional
Rights Subcommittee has no field investigators of its own. Its inquiry
was aided immeasurably by the many enlisted men and junior officers
who, recognizing that their loyalty to the Constitution was greater than
some notion of institutional loyalty, provided the subcommittee with
facts, documents, leads and criticisms of official presentations. The "leak"
may have a bad reputation in official government circles, but it is the
single most important weapon available in any effort to disclose activity
that the government wishes to keep to itself. Without "leaks," the Congress, the press, and the public would remain ignorant of those very
facts which are critical to the successful operation of any public policy.
The Army surveillance investigation represented the first concerted
legislative examination of domestic intelligence activities in recent years.
It presaged an increasing public and official recognition that domestic
intelligence is perhaps the single most important, unexamined aspect of
public policy in our country. The subcommittee's investigation played
an important role in bringing this issue to the surface, and subsequent
events have reinforced the necessity for a thorough public exploration
of these problems. Perhaps no other activity of government poses such
a threat to individual liberties as the use of the military for domestic
intelligence programs. But the country also can no longer afford to
permit any governmental agency to conduct domestic intelligence in a
secret and uncontrolled fashion.

